HackTheBox - Sizzle

IppSec · Beginner ·🧠 Large Language Models ·7y ago

Key Takeaways

Exploits a HackTheBox machine using LDAP, SMB, and certificate authority analysis to discover writeable shares and crack a NetNTLM hash using Hashcat

Original Description

01:04 - Begin of Recon 06:45 - Checking the web interfaces 07:20 - Discovering there is a Certificate Authority 08:50 - Taking a look at LDAP 10:55 - Examining SMB to find shares 12:00 - Searching the Operations and Department Shares 14:50 - Viewing permissions of a SMB Share with SMBCACLS 19:10 - Discovering a writeable share, dropping a SCF File to get a hash 22:04 - Using Hashcat to crack NetNTLMv2 24:40 - Using SMBMap to identify if this user has access to anything extra 25:40 - Discovering the CertSRV Directory 28:00 - Discovering Powershell Remoting 30:00 - Error from WinRM (Need SSL) 31:00 - Using openSSL to generate a private key 31:52 - Going to /CertSRV to sign our certificate as Amanda 34:00 - Adding the SSL Authentication to WinrM 35:15 - Playing with LDAP Again (with the Amanda Creds) 37:50 - Shell on the box with WinRM as Amanda 38:15 - Running SharpHound to enumerate Active Directory 40:29 - Applocker is on the box, lets move it in the windows directory 42:00 - Trying to get the bloodhound data off the box. 44:20 - Starting bloodhound 45:27 - File didn't copy lets load up Covenant 49:30 - Covenant is up and running - Create a HTTP Listener 50:30 - Hosting a Launcher 52:30 - Getting a grunt 54:40 - Running SeatBelt 57:00 - Running SharpHound 60:00 - Finally uploading the bloodhound data 01:01:18 - Running Bloodhound with all Collection Methods 01:05:15 - Discovering the MRLKY can DCSYNC 01:07:25 - Cannot kerberoast because of the Double Hop Problem, create token with MakeToken 01:12:30 - Cracked the Kerberoasted Hash, doing maketoken with mrlky and running DCSYnc 01:14:40 - Running WMIExec to get Administrator 01:22:00 - UNINTENDED Method 1: Amanda can write to Clean.bat 01:24:30 - UNINTENDED Method 2: Forensic artifacts leave MRKLY Hash in C:\windows\system32\file.txt
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Playlist

Uploads from IppSec · IppSec · 0 of 60

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3 HackTheBox - Arctic
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4 HackTheBox - Brainfuck
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9 HackTheBox - Devel
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10 Reversing Malicious Office Document (Macro) Emotet(?)
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12 HackTheBox - Pivoting Update: Granny and Grandpa
HackTheBox - Pivoting Update: Granny and Grandpa
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13 HackTheBox - Optimum
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14 HackTheBox - Charon
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15 HackTheBox - Sneaky
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16 HackTheBox - Holiday
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17 HackTheBox - Europa
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18 Introduction to tmux
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19 HackTheBox - Blocky
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20 HackTheBox - Nineveh
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21 HackTheBox - Jail
HackTheBox - Jail
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22 HackTheBox - Blue
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23 HackTheBox - Calamity
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24 HackTheBox - Shrek
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25 HackTheBox - Mirai
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26 HackTheBox - Shocker
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27 HackTheBox - Mantis
HackTheBox - Mantis
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28 HackTheBox - Node
HackTheBox - Node
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29 HackTheBox - Kotarak
HackTheBox - Kotarak
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30 HackTheBox - Enterprise
HackTheBox - Enterprise
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31 HackTheBox - Sense
HackTheBox - Sense
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32 HackTheBox - Minion
HackTheBox - Minion
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33 VulnHub - Sokar
VulnHub - Sokar
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34 VulnHub - Pinkys Palace v2
VulnHub - Pinkys Palace v2
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35 HackTheBox - Inception
HackTheBox - Inception
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36 Vulnhub - Trollcave 1.2
Vulnhub - Trollcave 1.2
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37 HackTheBox - Ariekei
HackTheBox - Ariekei
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38 HackTheBox - Flux Capacitor
HackTheBox - Flux Capacitor
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39 HackTheBox - Jeeves
HackTheBox - Jeeves
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40 HackTheBox - Tally
HackTheBox - Tally
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41 HackTheBox - CrimeStoppers
HackTheBox - CrimeStoppers
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42 HackTheBox - Fulcrum
HackTheBox - Fulcrum
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43 HackTheBox - Chatterbox
HackTheBox - Chatterbox
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44 HackTheBox - Falafel
HackTheBox - Falafel
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45 How To Create Empire Modules
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46 HackTheBox - Nightmare
HackTheBox - Nightmare
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47 HackTheBox - Nightmarev2  - Speed Run/Unintended Solutions
HackTheBox - Nightmarev2 - Speed Run/Unintended Solutions
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48 HackTheBox - Bart
HackTheBox - Bart
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49 HackTheBox -  Aragog
HackTheBox - Aragog
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50 HackTheBox - Valentine
HackTheBox - Valentine
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51 HackTheBox - Silo
HackTheBox - Silo
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52 HackTheBox - Rabbit
HackTheBox - Rabbit
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53 HackTheBox - Celestial
HackTheBox - Celestial
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54 HackTheBox - Stratosphere
HackTheBox - Stratosphere
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55 HackTheBox - Poison
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56 HackTheBox - Canape
HackTheBox - Canape
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57 HackTheBox - Olympus
HackTheBox - Olympus
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58 HackTheBox - Sunday
HackTheBox - Sunday
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59 HackTheBox - Fighter
HackTheBox - Fighter
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60 HackTheBox - Bounty
HackTheBox - Bounty
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Chapters (36)

1:04 Begin of Recon
6:45 Checking the web interfaces
7:20 Discovering there is a Certificate Authority
8:50 Taking a look at LDAP
10:55 Examining SMB to find shares
12:00 Searching the Operations and Department Shares
14:50 Viewing permissions of a SMB Share with SMBCACLS
19:10 Discovering a writeable share, dropping a SCF File to get a hash
22:04 Using Hashcat to crack NetNTLMv2
24:40 Using SMBMap to identify if this user has access to anything extra
25:40 Discovering the CertSRV Directory
28:00 Discovering Powershell Remoting
30:00 Error from WinRM (Need SSL)
31:00 Using openSSL to generate a private key
31:52 Going to /CertSRV to sign our certificate as Amanda
34:00 Adding the SSL Authentication to WinrM
35:15 Playing with LDAP Again (with the Amanda Creds)
37:50 Shell on the box with WinRM as Amanda
38:15 Running SharpHound to enumerate Active Directory
40:29 Applocker is on the box, lets move it in the windows directory
42:00 Trying to get the bloodhound data off the box.
44:20 Starting bloodhound
45:27 File didn't copy lets load up Covenant
49:30 Covenant is up and running - Create a HTTP Listener
50:30 Hosting a Launcher
52:30 Getting a grunt
54:40 Running SeatBelt
57:00 Running SharpHound
1:00:00 Finally uploading the bloodhound data
1:01:18 Running Bloodhound with all Collection Methods
1:05:15 Discovering the MRLKY can DCSYNC
1:07:25 Cannot kerberoast because of the Double Hop Problem, create token with MakeTok
1:12:30 Cracked the Kerberoasted Hash, doing maketoken with mrlky and running DCSYnc
1:14:40 Running WMIExec to get Administrator
1:22:00 UNINTENDED Method 1: Amanda can write to Clean.bat
1:24:30 UNINTENDED Method 2: Forensic artifacts leave MRKLY Hash in C:\windows\system3
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